The Voters Dilemma And Democratic Accountability Latin America And Beyond Lyne by Lyne, Mona M., 1960- instant download after payment.

xvii, 302 p. : 24 cm, \"Presents evidence that under certain widespread structural conditions, democratic accountability falls prey to the same N-person prisoner's dilemma that plagues any other decentralized attempt to procure collective goods. Examines four prominent democracies: postwar and contemporary Brazil and pre-Chavez and contemporary Venezuela\"--Provided by publisher, Includes bibliographical references (p. [273]-288) and index, Introduction : theories of democratic accountability and development in Brazil and Venezuela -- The voter's dilemma : collective or clientelistic goods? -- Are voters in Brazil and Venezuela opting for policy-based or quid pro quo voting? -- Party behavior : policy-based or quid pro quo appeals to voters? -- Internal party organization : align individual and collective goals to build a policy reputation or to ensure efficient vote buying? -- Legislative organization : governing majority agenda control or mutual veto? -- Policy choice : generate sustained growth or maximize quid pro quo?