Understanding Individual Differences In Theory Of Mind Via Representation Of Minds Not Mental States Jane R Conway Caroline Catmur Geoffrey Bird by Jane R. Conway & Caroline Catmur & Geoffrey Bird 103758/S134230181559X instant download after payment.

Abstract

The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses onmental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, andis characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for the effect of variability in the population of minds towhich individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest thattheoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adoptinga ‘Mind-space’ framework; that minds, like faces, are represented within a multidimensional psychological space. This Mindspace framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differencesin the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance forunderstanding human development, intergroup relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.Keywords Theory of mind . Face-space . Individual differences . Social cognition . Mind-space