EbookBell.com

Most ebook files are in PDF format, so you can easily read them using various software such as Foxit Reader or directly on the Google Chrome browser.
Some ebook files are released by publishers in other formats such as .awz, .mobi, .epub, .fb2, etc. You may need to install specific software to read these formats on mobile/PC, such as Calibre.

Please read the tutorial at this link: https://ebookbell.com/faq

We offer FREE conversion to the popular formats you request; however, this may take some time. Therefore, right after payment, please email us, and we will try to provide the service as quickly as possible.

For some exceptional file formats or broken links (if any), please refrain from opening any disputes. Instead, email us first, and we will try to assist within a maximum of 6 hours.

EbookBell Team

Bargaining Over The Bomb The Successes And Failures Of Nuclear Negotiations Spaniel

Name: Bargaining Over The Bomb The Successes And Failures Of Nuclear Negotiations Spaniel
SKU: BELL-54692366
Price: 31.00 USD
Availability: InStock
Rating: 4.25 (88 reviews)

SKU: BELL-54692366

$ 31.00 ~~$ 45.00~~ (-31%)

4.3

88 reviews

Bargaining Over The Bomb The Successes And Failures Of Nuclear Negotiations Spaniel instant download after payment.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

File Extension: PDF

File size: 2.06 MB

Pages: 224

Author: Spaniel, William

ISBN: 9781108477055, 9781108630610, 9781108701846, 1108477054, 1108630618, 1108701841

Language: English

Year: 2019

Product desciption

Bargaining Over The Bomb The Successes And Failures Of Nuclear Negotiations Spaniel by Spaniel, William 9781108477055, 9781108630610, 9781108701846, 1108477054, 1108630618, 1108701841 instant download after payment.

Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.