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Formulating Principalagent Service Contracts For A Revenue Generating Unit 1st Edition Shuo Zeng

  • SKU: BELL-5141428
Formulating Principalagent Service Contracts For A Revenue Generating Unit 1st Edition Shuo Zeng
$ 31.00 $ 45.00 (-31%)

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Formulating Principalagent Service Contracts For A Revenue Generating Unit 1st Edition Shuo Zeng instant download after payment.

Publisher: Springer International Publishing
File Extension: PDF
File size: 2.55 MB
Pages: 129
Author: Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror (auth.)
ISBN: 9783319186719, 331918671X
Language: English
Year: 2016
Edition: 1

Product desciption

Formulating Principalagent Service Contracts For A Revenue Generating Unit 1st Edition Shuo Zeng by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror (auth.) 9783319186719, 331918671X instant download after payment.

This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.

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