This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes a mechanistic model that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.

While mechanistic models of explanation are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a novel reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops a neurophenomenological approach to dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that it can deliver a dynamic model of a target phenomenon, in this case a model of subjective experience, and inform the search for an underlying mechanism.

Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences.