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Nuclear Deterrence Theory The Search For Credibility 1st Edition Robert Powell

Name: Nuclear Deterrence Theory The Search For Credibility 1st Edition Robert Powell
SKU: BELL-1794458
Price: 31.00 USD
Availability: InStock
Rating: 5 (40 reviews)

SKU: BELL-1794458

$ 31.00 ~~$ 45.00~~ (-31%)

5.0

40 reviews

Nuclear Deterrence Theory The Search For Credibility 1st Edition Robert Powell instant download after payment.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

File Extension: PDF

File size: 6.14 MB

Pages: 240

Author: Robert Powell

ISBN: 9780511551598, 9780521063999, 9780521375276, 0511551592, 052106399X, 0521375274

Language: English

Year: 2008

Edition: 1

Product desciption

Nuclear Deterrence Theory The Search For Credibility 1st Edition Robert Powell by Robert Powell 9780511551598, 9780521063999, 9780521375276, 0511551592, 052106399X, 0521375274 instant download after payment.

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.