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Oligopoly Pricing Old Ideas And New Tools Xavier Vives

  • SKU: BELL-1702916
Oligopoly Pricing Old Ideas And New Tools Xavier Vives
$ 31.00 $ 45.00 (-31%)

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Oligopoly Pricing Old Ideas And New Tools Xavier Vives instant download after payment.

Publisher: The MIT Press
File Extension: PDF
File size: 6.01 MB
Pages: 448
Author: Xavier Vives
ISBN: 9780262220606, 9780262720403, 9780585224138, 0262220601, 026272040X, 0585224137
Language: English
Year: 2001

Product desciption

Oligopoly Pricing Old Ideas And New Tools Xavier Vives by Xavier Vives 9780262220606, 9780262720403, 9780585224138, 0262220601, 026272040X, 0585224137 instant download after payment.

The "oligopoly problem"--the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing.Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

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