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ISBN 10: 1138737658
ISBN 13: 9781138737655
Author: John MacFarlane
Introductory logic is generally taught as a straightforward technical discipline. In this book, John MacFarlane helps the reader think about the limitations of, presuppositions of, and alternatives to classical first-order predicate logic, making this an ideal introduction to philosophical logic for any student who already has completed an introductory logic course. The book explores the following questions. Are there quantificational idioms that cannot be expressed with the familiar universal and existential quantifiers? How can logic be extended to capture modal notions like necessity and obligation? Does the material conditional adequately capture the meaning of 'if'—and if not, what are the alternatives? Should logical consequence be understood in terms of models or in terms of proofs? Can one intelligibly question the validity of basic logical principles like Modus Ponens or Double Negation Elimination? Is the fact that classical logic validates the inference from a contradiction to anything a flaw, and if so, how can logic be modified to repair it? How, exactly, is logic related to reasoning? Must classical logic be revised in order to be applied to vague language, and if so how? Each chapter is organized around suggested readings and includes exercises designed to deepen the reader's understanding. Key Features: An integrated treatment of the technical and philosophical issues comprising philosophical logic Designed to serve students taking only one course in logic beyond the introductory level Provides tools and concepts necessary to understand work in many areas of analytic philosophy Includes exercises, suggested readings, and suggestions for further exploration in each chapter
1 Fundamentals
1.1 Propositional logic
1.1.1 Grammar
1.1.2 Semantics
1.1.3 Proofs
1.1.4 Proof strategy
1.1.5 The relation of semantics and proofs
1.2 Predicate logic
1.2.1 Grammar
1.2.2 Scope
1.2.3 Semantics
1.2.4 Proofs
1.3 Identity
1.3.1 Grammar
1.3.2 Semantics
1.3.3 Proofs
1.4 Use and mention
1.5 Further readings
2 Quantifiers
2.1 Beyond ∀ and ∃
2.1.1 What is a quantifier?
2.1.2 Semantics of binary quantifiers
2.1.3 Most: an essentially binary quantifier
2.1.4 Unary quantifiers beyond ∀ and ∃
2.1.5 Generalized quantifiers
2.2 Definite descriptions
2.1.1 Terms or quantifiers?
2.2.2 Definite descriptions and scope
2.2.3 Russell's theory of descriptions
2.2.4 Proofs
2.3 Second-order quantifiers
2.3.1 Standard semantics for monadic second-order logic
2.3.2 Expressive limitations of first-order logic
2.3.3 Set theory in sheep's clothing?
2.3.4 Boolos's plural interpretation
2.3.5 Beyond monadic second-order logic
2.4 Substitutional quantifiers
2.4.1 Objectual and substitutional quantification
2.4.2 Nonexistent objects
2.4.3 Quantifying into attitude reports
2.4.4 Sentence quantifiers
2.4.5 Quantifying into quotes
2.4.6 Defining truth
2.4.7 Quantifying into quotes and paradox
2.4.8 The circularity worry
Further readings
3 Modal Logic
3.1 Modal propositional logic
3.1.1 Grammar
3.1.2 Semantics
3.1.3 Modal logics from K to S5
3.1.4 Proofs
3.2 Modal predicate logic
3.2.1 Opaque contexts
3.2.2
3.2.3 The number of planets argument
3.2.4 Smullyan's reply
3.3 The slingshot argument
3.3.1 Applications of slingshot arguments
3.3.2 The Gödel slingshot
3.3.3 Critique of the slingshot
3.4 Kripke's defense of de re modality
3.4.1 Kripke's strategy
3.4.2 The contingent a priori
3.4.3 The necessary a posteriori
3.4.4 Epistemic and alethic modals
Further readings
4 Conditionals
4.1 The material conditional
4.1.1 Indicative vs. counterfactual
4.1.2 Entailments between indicatives and material conditionals
4.1.3 Thomson against the “received opinion”
4.2 No truth conditions?
4.2.1 Arguments for the material conditional analysis
4.2.2 Arguments against the material conditional analysis
4.2.3 Rejecting Or-to-if
4.2.4 Edgington's positive view
4.2.5 Against truth conditions
4.3 Stalnaker's semantics and pragmatics
4.3.1 Propositions, assertion, and the common ground
4.3.2 Semantics
4.3.3 Reasonable but invalid inferences
4.3.4 Contraposition and Hypothetical Syllogism
4.3.5 The argument for fatalism
4.4 Is Modus Ponens valid?
The intuitive counterexamples
4.4.2 McGee's counterexamples as seen by Edgington
4.4.3 McGee's counterexamples as seen by Stalnaker
4.4.4 Modus Ponens vs. Exportation
5 Logical Consequence via Models
5.1 Informal characterizations of consequence
5.1.1 In terms of necessity
5.1.2 In terms of proof
5.1.3 In terms of counterexamples
5.2 Tarski's account of logical consequence
5.2.1 Tarski's aim
5.2.2 Why proof-based approaches won't work
5.2.3 Criteria of adequacy
5.2.4 The insufficiency of (F)
5.2.5 The semantic definition
5.2.7 Logical constants
5.3 Interpretational and representational semantics
6 Logical Consequence via Proofs
6.1 Introduction rules as self-justifying
6.1.1 Carnap's Copernican turn
6.1.2 Prior's article
6.1.3 Stevenson's response
6.1.4 Belnap's Response
6.1.5 Prawitz's Response
6.2 Prawitz's proof-theoretic account of consequence
6.2.1 Arguments
6.2.2 Validity
6.2.3 ∧ Intro and Elim
6.2.4 ∨ Intro and Elim
6.2.5 Philosophical reflections
6.3 Intuitionistic logic
Why the name “intuitionistic”?
6.4 Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic
6.5 Fundamental logical disagreement
6.5.1 Changing the subject?
6.5.2 Interpreting classical logic in intuitionistic logic
6.5.3 Intuitionistic in classical
6.5.4 Logical pluralism
7 Relevance, Logic, and Reasoning
7.1 Motivations for relevance logic
7.2 The Lewis Argument
7.2.1 Rejecting Disjunctive Weakening
7.2.2 Rejecting transitivity
7.2.3 Rejecting Disjunctive Syllogism
7.3 First-degree entailment
7.3.1 A syntactic procedure
7.3.2 The four-valued truth tables
7.4 Logic and reasoning
7.5 Uses for relevance logic
7.5.1 Dialetheism
7.5.2 The moderate approach
7.5.3 Truth in a corpus
8 Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox
8.1 What is vagueness?
Borderline cases
No sharp boundaries
The sorites
8.2 Three-valued logics
8.2.1 Semantics for connectives
8.2.2 Defining validity in multivalued logics
8.2.3 Application to the sorites
8.3 Fuzzy logics
8.3.1 Semantics
8.3.2 Application to the sorites
8.3.3 Can we make sense of degrees of truth?
8.3.4 Troubles with degree-functionality
8.4 Supervaluations
8.4.1 Application to sorites
8.4.2 Higher-order vagueness
8.4.3 The logic of definiteness
8.5 Vagueness in the world?
8.5.1 Evans on vague identity
8.5.2 Evans and Quine
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Tags: John MacFarlane, Philosophical, Contemporary