Provable Security Second International Conference ProvSec 2008 Shanghai China October 30 November 1 2008 Proceedings 1st Edition by Joon Sang Baek, Feng Bao, Kefei Chen ISBN 3540887326 9783540887324 by Huawei Huang, Bo Yang, Shenglin Zhu, Guozhen Xiao (auth.), Joonsang Baek, Feng Bao, Kefei Chen, Xuejia Lai (eds.) 9783540887324, 3540887326 instant download after payment.

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ISBN 10: 3540887326 
ISBN 13: 9783540887324
Author: Joon Sang Baek, Feng Bao, Kefei Chen

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Second International Conference on Provable Security, ProvSec 2008, held in Shanghai, China, October 30 - November 1, 2008. The 25 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 79 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on Encryption, Signature, Analysis, Application of Hash Functions, Universal Composability, and Applications.

Provable Security Second International Conference ProvSec 2008 Shanghai China October 30 November 1 2008 Proceedings 1st Table of contents:

1. Encryption
2. Generalized ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem Based on a New Diffie-Hellman Problem
3. Introduction
4. Preliminaries
5. Complexity Assumptions
6. A Class of Vector Space over Finite Field $F_q^2$
7. Generalized Computational Group Schemes
8. ECDH Problem and ECDH Assumption
9. EDDH Problem and EDDH Assumption
10. New Generalized ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem
11. Security of the Scheme
12. References
13. Tweakable Pseudorandom Permutation from Generalized Feistel Structure
14. Introduction
15. Preliminaries
16. Generalized Feistel Structure
17. Tweakable Blockcipher from Generalized Feistel Structure
18. Almost Universal Hash Function [2]
19. Tweakable Blockciphers with CPA Security
20. Proof of Lemma 4
21. Tweakable Blockciphers with CCA Security
22. How to Input Multiple Tweaks
23. Multiple Tweaks without Increasing the Number of Rounds
24. Multiple Tweaks with Increasing the Number of Rounds
25. Conclusions
26. References
27. Timed-Release Encryption Revisited
28. Introduction
29. Related Work
30. Contributions
31. Security Models of Timed-Release Encryption
32. Syntax of Timed-Release Encryption
33. Confidentiality
34. Pre-open Capability
35. Release-Time Confidentiality
36. Analysis of a Recent TRE Scheme in ESORICS ’07
37. Review
38. Attacks
39. Augmenting Chow $et al.’s$ TRE Scheme with Pre-open Capability and Release-Time Confidentiality
40. Preliminaries
41. Construction
42. Discussions on the Security Properties
43. Conclusion
44. References
45. Efficient and Provably Secure Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption
46. Introduction
47. Preliminaries
48. Computational Assumptions
49. Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption
50. Framework of Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption
51. Security Model for Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption
52. Certificateless Multi-receiver Signcryption Scheme (CLMSC)
53. Security Results
54. Efficiency Analysis and Comparison
55. Conclusion
56. References
57. A CCA Secure Hybrid Damg${aa}$rd’s ElGamal Encryption
58. Introduction
59. Notation and Standard Definitions
60. Construction
61. Damg${aa}$ard’s ElGamal Encryption [5]
62. Hybrid Damg${aa}$rd’s ElGamal Encryption
63. Comparision with Kurosawa-Desmedt Scheme
64. Assumptions Used in the Security Analyses
65. Hashed Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
66. Diffie-Hellman Knowledge Assumption (DHK)
67. Extended $DHK$ Assumptions
68. Security of the Hybrid Damg${aa}$rd’s ElGamal Encryption
69. Hardness of the $EDHK$ Problem in the Generic Group Model
70. Conclusion
71. References
72. Signature
73. Construction of Yet Another Forward Secure Signature Scheme Using Bilinear Maps
74. Introduction
75. Preliminaries
76. Cryptographic Assumptions
77. Forward Secure Signature Scheme
78. Security Definition
79. The Proposed Forward Secure Signature Scheme
80. Notations and Constructions
81. Description of the Scheme
82. Performance Analysis
83. Security Analysis
84. Conclusions
85. References
86. Optimal Online/Offline Signature: How to Sign a Message without Online Computation
87. Introduction
88. Definitions
89. O-3 Signature
90. Bilinear Map
91. Complexity
92. O-3 Signature
93. Scheme
94. Security
95. Generic Construction
96. Generic Scheme
97. Security and Efficiency
98. Identity-Based O-3 Signature
99. Conclusion
100. References
101. Round-Optimal Blind Signatures from Waters Signatures
102. Introduction
103. Preliminaries
104. Bilinear Groups
105. Signature Schemes and Their Security
106. Public Key Encryption Schemes and Their Security
107. Setup Assumptions
108. Compilation of Σ-Protocols in the Registered Public Key Model
109. Blind Signature Schemes and Their Security
110. Our Blind Signature Scheme
111. A Sketch of Our Scheme
112. The Protocol compile $(SigmaOR)$
113. Our Scheme
114. References
115. Secure Proxy Multi-signature Scheme in the Standard Model
116. Introduction
117. Preliminaries
118. Bilinear Pairings
119. Complexity Assumption
120. Formal Model of Proxy Multi-signature
121. Security Model
122. A Secure Proxy Multi-signature Scheme
123. Security Analysis
124. Conclusions
125. References
126. Server-Aided Verification Signatures: Definitions and New Constructions
127. Introduction
128. Server-Aided Verification Signatures
129. Syntax of a Signature Scheme $Sigma$
130. Syntax of a Server-Aided Verification Signature Scheme $SAV-Sigma$
131. Computational-Saving in $SAV-Sigma$
132. Existentially Unforgeable $SAV-Sigma$
133. Definition of Existential Unforgeability of $SAV-Sigma$
134. Further Observations on $EUF-SAV-Sigma$
135. Analysis of the $SAV-Sigma$ in Asiacrypt’05
136. Existentially Unforgeable SAV-BLS
137. Complexity Assumptions
138. Description of Existentially Unforgeable SAV-BLS
139. $SAV-Sigma$ Secure against Collusion and Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks
140. Definition of the Security of $SAV-Sigma$ against Collusion and Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks
141. SAV-BLS Secure against Collusion and Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks
142. Conclusion
143. References
144. Analysis
145. On Proofs of Security for DAA Schemes
146. Introduction
147. Notation and Preliminaries
148. DAA Execution and Security Model
149. A Note on the Proof of the Scheme of [3]
150. Security Analysis of the CMS Scheme
151. References
152. Cryptanalysis of Vo-Kim Forward Secure Signature in ICISC 2005
153. Introduction
154. Forward Secure Signature Scheme and Its Security
155. Review of Vo-Kim Scheme
156. The Attacking Algorithms
157. The First Algorithm
158. The Second Algorithm
159. The Further Analysis of Security Proof in [14]
160. Conclusions
161. References
162. Computationally Sound Symbolic Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols with Ideal Setups
163. Introduction
164. Background
165. A Subset of PAPi Calculus
166. The UC Framework and UCSA Framework
167. A Simple Language for Probabilistic Protocols
168. Symbolic Interpretation
169. Computational (Hybrid) Interpretation
170. Faithfulness of the Symbolic Model
171. Conclusions
172. References
173. On the Equivalence of Generic Group Models
174. Introduction
175. Related Work
176. Our Contribution
177. Generic Group Models
178. Shoup’s Generic Group Model
179. Maurer’s Generic Group Model
180. The Equivalence of Generic Group Models
181. From Maurer’s GGM to Shoup’s GGM
182. From Shoup’s GGM to Maurer’s GGM
183. Conclusions
184. References
185. The Analysis of an Efficient and Provably Secure ID-Based Threshold Signcryption Scheme and Its Secu
186. Introduction
187. Preliminaries
188. Bilinear Pairings
189. Related Complexity Assumptions
190. Formal Model and Security Notions of IDTSC Scheme
191. Generic Scheme
192. Security Notions
193. The LY Scheme and Its Security Analysis
194. The LY Scheme
195. Security Analysis of the LY Scheme
196. Our Improved Scheme and Its Analysis
197. Our Scheme
198. Security Analysis
199. Efficiency Analysis
200. Conclusion
201. References
202. Application of Hash Functions
203. Leaky Random Oracle
204. Introduction
205. Motivation
206. Our Contribution
207. Related Works
208. Leaky Random Oracle Model
209. Security Analysis of FDH in LROM
210. FDH
211. Security of FDH in LROM
212. Security Analysis of OAEP in LROM
213. OAEP
214. Security of OAEP in LROM
215. Security Analysis of Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem in LROM
216. Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem
217. Security of Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem in LROM
218. Security Analysis of Kurosawa-Desmedt Cryptosystem in LROM
219. Kurosawa-Desmedt Cryptosystem
220. Security of Kurosawa-Desmedt Cryptosystem in LROM
221. Security Analysis of NAXOS in LROM
222. Security Notion of Authenticated Key Exchange Schemes
223. NAXOS
224. Security of NAXOS in LROM
225. Discussion
226. Difference of Effects on Security
227. Relation between the Standard Model
228. Relation between Randomness Revealing
229. FurtherWorks
230. References
231. How to Use Merkle-Damg°ard—On the Security Relations between Signature Schemes and Their Inner Ha
232. Introduction
233. Preliminaries
234. Provable Security Statements
235. Hash Functions and Related Security Notions
236. Signature Schemes and Related Security Notions
237. Analyzing Security Relations for Hash-and-Sign Signatures
238. Identified Properties
239. Attacks and Positive Security Relations for Hash-and-Sign Signatures
240. Attacks and Security Proof for First-Hash-Then-Sign Signatures
241. Merkle-Damg${aa}$rd-Based Hash Function Families
242. Hash Function Families Based on Merkle-Damg${aa}$rd
243. MDInstantiation with Operating Mode F(M, r) = $H_s(M || r)$
244. MDInstantiation with Operating Mode F(M, r) = $H_s(r || M)$
245. Concrete Security Figures for Two Instantiations of F(M, r)
246. Conclusion
247. References
248. Can We Construct Unbounded Time-Stamping Schemes from Collision-Free Hash Functions?
249. Introduction
250. Notation and Definitions
251. Hash and Publish Time-Stamping
252. Cryptographic Reductions and Oracle Separation
253. Hash Tree Oracle
254. Disperser Adversary
255. Infeasibility of the Pair Checking Approach
256. Other Possible Types of Hash-Adversaries
257. Input-Output Pair Check
258. Output Comparison
259. Using All Three Approaches
260. Input-Output Comparison
261. Discussion
262. References
263. Universal Composability
264. Relationship of Three Cryptographic Channels in the UC Framework
265. Introduction
266. Preliminaries
267. (Task) Probabilistic I/O Automata
268. Universal Composability
269. Three Cryptographic Channels and Definitions
270. Secure Channel (SC)
271. Two-Anonymous Channel (2AC)
272. Direction-Indeterminable Channel (DIC)
273. Security Definitions
274. Equivalence between DIC and 2AC
275. Reduction of DIC to 2AC
276. Reduction of 2AC to DIC
277. Equivalence between DIC and SC
278. Reduction of SC to DIC
279. Reduction of DIC to SC
280. Conclusion
281. References
282. A Universally Composable Framework for the Analysis of Browser-Based Security Protocols
283. Introduction
284. Relation to Previous Work
285. BBUC Model
286. Notations
287. Network Services
288. Modeling User Behavior: A First Attempt
289. Modeling Browser Behavior: The Aggregation of Messages
290. Functional Corruption Model
291. Conclusion
292. References
293. Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
294. Introduction
295. Related Work
296. UC Cryptographic Library
297. Adding Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
298. The Cryptographic Primitives
299. Ideal Library
300. Real (or Hybrid) Library
301. The Simulator
302. Example: A Simple e-Voting System
303. Security of the e-Voting System
304. Proof for the Ideal Setting
305. Discussion and Conclusions
306. References
307. Universally Composable Security Analysis of TLS
308. Introduction
309. Preliminaries
310. Notations
311. Cryptographic Building Blocks and Their Constructions
312. Transport Layer Security
313. TLS in a Nutshell
314. Roadmap for the Modular Analysis of TLS
315. Analysis of TLS Subroutines
316. TLS UC-Realizes Secure Communication Sessions
317. Universal Secure Communication Sessions
318. Protocol $TLSc$ Realizes $Fscs$
319. Conclusion
320. References
321. Round Optimal Universally Composable Oblivious Transfer Protocols
322. Introduction
323. This Paper
324. Universally Composable Model
325. Oblivious Double-Trapdoor Cryptosystem
326. Oblivious Transfer Protocol
327. Description of Protocol
328. The Proof of Security
329. Conclusion
330. References
331. Applications
332. A Tamper-Evident Voting Machine Resistant to Covert Channels
333. Introduction
334. System Model
335. Preliminaries
336. The Proposed Voting Scheme
337. Security Analysis and Discussions
338. Conclusion
339. References
340. Self-healing Key Distribution with Revocation and Resistance to the Collusion Attack in Wireless Sen
341. Introduction
342. Related Work
343. A Original Scheme and Two Attacks
344. Review of R.Dutta’s Scheme
345. Attack 1: Launched by Any User
346. Attack 2: Launched by a Newly Joined User
347. A Modified Scheme
348. A New Self-healing Key Distribution with Revocation and Resistance to the Collusion Attack
349. Security Model
350. A New Self-healing Key Distribution with Revocation and Resistance to the Collusion Attack
351. Analysis
352. Self-healing Property
353. Forward Secrecy
354. Backward Secrecy
355. Resistance to a Collusion Attack
356. Efficiency Comparisons with Some Previous Schemes
357. Conclusions
358. References

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