Reconciling With The Taliban Toward An Alternative Grand Strategy In Afghanistan Ashley J Tellis United States President 2009 Obama Carnegie Endowment For International Peace by Ashley J Tellis; United States. President (2009- : Obama); Carnegie Endowment For International Peace instant download after payment.

The run-up to the announcement of President Obama’s new “Af-Pak” strategy provoked a flurry of “new solutions” to the conflict. Promoting reconciliation with the Taliban is one idea that has reappeared—even in the administration’s own White Paper on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. While this notion would rightly have been considered ridiculous a few years ago, many in Europe and the United States obviously believe that stabilizing Afghanistan may require just that. In fact, it would be the worst approach at this time—and it is destined to fail so long as key Taliban constituents are convinced that military victory in Afghanistan is inevitable.

Any effort at reconciliation today will, therefore, undermine the credibility of American power and the success of the Afghan mission. Most important, reconciling with the Taliban is both premature and unnecessary for the success of Western aims. The Afghan public, by an overwhelming margin of 82 percent to 4 percent, is still very much opposed to the Taliban—not only viewing them as the country’s biggest threat but also desperately seeking the success that ought to accrue from the presence of Western military forces in their country. Consequently, although the situation in Afghanistan is serious, it is by no means hopeless—and can be retrieved through a concerted modification of current NATO strategy, including a return to proper counterinsurgency operations.