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Sovereign Debt Crises And Negotiations In Brazil And Mexico 18881914 1st Ed Leonardo Weller

  • SKU: BELL-7148024
Sovereign Debt Crises And Negotiations In Brazil And Mexico 18881914 1st Ed Leonardo Weller
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Sovereign Debt Crises And Negotiations In Brazil And Mexico 18881914 1st Ed Leonardo Weller instant download after payment.

Publisher: Springer International Publishing;Palgrave Macmillan
File Extension: PDF
File size: 2.25 MB
Author: Leonardo Weller
ISBN: 9783319736327, 9783319736334, 3319736329, 3319736337
Language: English
Year: 2018
Edition: 1st ed.

Product desciption

Sovereign Debt Crises And Negotiations In Brazil And Mexico 18881914 1st Ed Leonardo Weller by Leonardo Weller 9783319736327, 9783319736334, 3319736329, 3319736337 instant download after payment.

This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation.

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