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The Economics Of Social Protection Pierre Pestieau

  • SKU: BELL-54526362
The Economics Of Social Protection Pierre Pestieau
$ 31.00 $ 45.00 (-31%)

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The Economics Of Social Protection Pierre Pestieau instant download after payment.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
File Extension: PDF
File size: 1.48 MB
Pages: 50
Author: Pierre Pestieau
ISBN: 9781009295482, 9781009454155, 9781009295475, 1009295489, 1009454153, 1009295470
Language: English
Year: 2023

Product desciption

The Economics Of Social Protection Pierre Pestieau by Pierre Pestieau 9781009295482, 9781009454155, 9781009295475, 1009295489, 1009454153, 1009295470 instant download after payment.

The objective of this Element is to provide an analysis of social protection from an economic perspective. It relies on tools and methods widely used in public and insurance economics and comprises four main section besides the introduction. The first section is devoted to the design of social protection programs and their political sustainability. The second section assesses the efficiency and performance of social protection programs, and of the welfare state as a whole. In the third section, the relative merits of social and private insurance are analyzed as well as the design of optimum insurance contract with emphasis on health and pensions. The last section focuses on the implications of asymmetric information that may lead governments to adopt policies that would otherwise be rejected in a perfect information setting.

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