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The Robust Federation Principles Of Design Political Economy Of Institutions And Decisions 1st Edition Jenna Bednar

  • SKU: BELL-2330148
The Robust Federation Principles Of Design Political Economy Of Institutions And Decisions 1st Edition Jenna Bednar
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The Robust Federation Principles Of Design Political Economy Of Institutions And Decisions 1st Edition Jenna Bednar instant download after payment.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
File Extension: PDF
File size: 1.59 MB
Pages: 257
Author: Jenna Bednar
ISBN: 9780521878999, 0521878993
Language: English
Year: 2008
Edition: 1

Product desciption

The Robust Federation Principles Of Design Political Economy Of Institutions And Decisions 1st Edition Jenna Bednar by Jenna Bednar 9780521878999, 0521878993 instant download after payment.

The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness.

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