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The Strategic Analysis Of Judicial Behavior Lee Epstein Keren Weinshall

Name: The Strategic Analysis Of Judicial Behavior Lee Epstein Keren Weinshall
SKU: BELL-40671728
Price: 31.00 USD
Availability: InStock
Rating: 4.1 (70 reviews)

SKU: BELL-40671728

$ 31.00 ~~$ 45.00~~ (-31%)

4.1

70 reviews

The Strategic Analysis Of Judicial Behavior Lee Epstein Keren Weinshall instant download after payment.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

File Extension: PDF

File size: 1.46 MB

Pages: 62

Author: Lee Epstein & Keren Weinshall

ISBN: 9781009048859, 1009048856

Language: English

Year: 2021

Product desciption

The Strategic Analysis Of Judicial Behavior Lee Epstein Keren Weinshall by Lee Epstein & Keren Weinshall 9781009048859, 1009048856 instant download after payment.

The past decade has witnessed a worldwide explosion of work aimed at illuminating judicial-behavior: the choices judges make and the consequences of their choices. We focus on strategic accounts of judicial-behavior. As in other approaches to judging, preferences and institutions play a central role but strategic accounts are unique in one important respect: They draw attention to the interdependent - i.e., the strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather attend to the preferences and likely actions of other actors, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians, and the public. We survey the major methodological approaches for conducting strategic analysis and consider how scholars have used them to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on the judges' choices. As far as these studies have traveled in illuminating judicial-behavior, many opportunities for forward movement remain. We flag four in the conclusion.