Introduction

1 Reinhold’s life and works

1.1 Vienna (1757–1783)

1.2 Leipzig (1783–1784)

1.3 Weimar (1784–1787)

1.4 Jena (1787–1794)

2 Reinhold’s Enlightenment

2.1 Determining the concept ‘Enlightenment’

2.2 History and Enlightenment

2.2.1 The rationality of institutions over time

2.2.2 The development of human reason

2.3 Human reason

2.3.1 Reason and sensibility in matters of religion and superstition

2.3.2 Human reason and human nature

2.4 Reinhold’s Enlightenment versus blind faith: “Ueber den Hang zum Wunderbaren”, Herzenserle

2.5 Evaluation: Reinhold’s commitment to Enlightenment

3 Reinhold’s way to Kant

3.1 The controversy surrounding Herder’s Ideen: a story of a polemical exchange

3.1.1 Kant versus Herder

3.1.2 Reinhold versus Kant

3.1.3 Kant versus Reinhold

3.2 Voigt’s request and Reinhold’s plan: a story of political and economic interests

3.3 Reinhold’s own statements regarding his interest in Kant: a story of religious and intellectua

3.4 Evaluation: weaving the stories together

4 ‘Practical Reason’ in the “Merkur-Briefe”

4.1 The “Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie” and the pantheism controversy: the first two

4.2 Reinhold’s Kantian solution to the problem of the rational foundation of religion: the remaind

4.2.1 The third and fourth “Briefe”: systematic and historical backgrounds to Reinhold’s claim

4.2.2 The final four “Briefe”

4.2.2.1 Grounding the conviction of the continuing existence of the human soul

4.2.2.2 Brief history of the concept of the soul

4.3 Evaluation: practical reason and pure sensibility

4.3.1 Practical reason

4.3.2 Pure sensibility

5 ‘Practical reason’ in the Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens

5.1 Historical context of the Versuch

5.2 Structure and aims of the Versuch

5.2.1 Preface

5.2.2 Book I: the need for a theory of the faculty of representation

5.2.3 Book II: the theory of the faculty of representation

5.2.4 Book III: the theory of the faculty of cognition

5.2.4.1 Theory of sensibility

5.2.4.2 Theory of the understanding

5.2.4.3 Theory of reason

5.2.4.4 Section 86 and “Grundlinien der Theorie des Begehrungsvermögens”

5.3 Evaluation: practical reason in the Versuch

5.3.1 ‘Practical reason’/‘pure sensibility’ and the theory of the faculty of representation

5.3.2 Section 86 and Rehberg’s review of Kant’s second Critique

6 ‘Practical reason’ from Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens to

6.1 Practical reason and the will up to Briefe II

6.1.1 “Grundlinien”: implicit identification of practical reason and pure will

6.1.2 NTM-essays from 1791: explicit identification of practical reason and the will

6.1.3 “Beytrag”-essay: distinction between practical reason and the will

6.2 Briefe II

6.2.1 Structure and aims of Briefe II

6.2.2 Contents of Briefe II

6.2.2.1 The problem and the preparation of the solution: second to fifth “Briefe”

6.2.2.2 The solution: sixth to eighth “Briefe”

6.2.2.3 The beneficial consequences: ninth to eleventh “Briefe”

6.2.2.4 Philosophy and society: twelfth “Brief”

6.3 Evaluation: freeing the will

Conclusion

Bibliography

Index of persons