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Who Disciplines Bank Managers 1st Edition Andrea M Maechler Klaus Schaeck Martin Cihák

  • SKU: BELL-51286480
Who Disciplines Bank Managers 1st Edition Andrea M Maechler Klaus Schaeck Martin Cihák
$ 31.00 $ 45.00 (-31%)

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Who Disciplines Bank Managers 1st Edition Andrea M Maechler Klaus Schaeck Martin Cihák instant download after payment.

Publisher: International Monetary Fund
File Extension: EPUB
File size: 1.36 MB
Pages: 47
Author: Andrea M. Maechler; Klaus Schaeck; Martin Cihák
ISBN: 9781452783352, 1452783357
Language: English
Year: 2009
Edition: 1

Product desciption

Who Disciplines Bank Managers 1st Edition Andrea M Maechler Klaus Schaeck Martin Cihák by Andrea M. Maechler; Klaus Schaeck; Martin Cihák 9781452783352, 1452783357 instant download after payment.

We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a ''laboratory setting'' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders'' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.

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