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Why Its Ok To Be Amoral Ronald De Sousa

  • SKU: BELL-61518002
Why Its Ok To Be Amoral Ronald De Sousa
$ 31.00 $ 45.00 (-31%)

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Why Its Ok To Be Amoral Ronald De Sousa instant download after payment.

Publisher: Routledge
File Extension: PDF
File size: 4.35 MB
Pages: 208
Author: Ronald de Sousa
ISBN: 9781003278252, 1003278256
Language: English
Year: 2025

Product desciption

Why Its Ok To Be Amoral Ronald De Sousa by Ronald De Sousa 9781003278252, 1003278256 instant download after payment.

Why It’s OK to Be Amoral argues that self-righteous moralism has replaced religion as a source of embattled and gratuitous certainties. High- minded moral convictions invoke the authority of sacred moral truths, but there are no such truths. In reality, moral passions are rooted in atavistic emotional dispositions and arbitrary social conventions. While public and private discourse is saturated with guilt, shame and righteous indignation, professional philosophers, under cover of clever argumentation, promote the utopian idea that all practical questions have uniquely right answers—providing that you adopt the right moral principles. But their justifications for those principles appeal to contested ‘foundations’, among which no rational adjudication is possible. Moreover, because there are two discrepant ways of understanding motivation, our access to agents’ true reasons is never sufficiently reliable to warrant moral praise or blame. Finally, every agent has a wide diversity of reasons for action, yet moralists claim that some reasons trump all others, because they are ‘moral’ reasons. Since these too must be grounded in facts, that amounts to double counting some reasons. Having exposed these aspects of the institution of morality, this book suggests that if we cannot abstain altogether from moralising, we can at least try to use it against itself.

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